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ABSTRACT
Loa Alamoa ia constructing ●n integrated procmaa
monitoring/meterials contro~ ●nd accountin-
(PWIWAA) Syszem in the Mwvmt Tezting Line
for Actinide Separations (ATIAS) at the Lot
Alamoa Plutonium Facility. T’ha ATLAS will teat
and demonstrate new methods foc aqueoua proc-
essing of plutonium. The ATLAS will also de-
velop, tea-, ●nd demonstrate the concepts for
integrated process monitoring/materiala control
and ●ccountirlg. We deecribe how thit integrated
PWIWIA @vatem will function and provido bene-
fits to both procua research and materialu
accrwnting personnel.
1. Sumur
Nuclear mterialt accounting ia ●n iu!porkanl
part of nuclear fuel cycle operation. rt pro-
vides aasuranco that nuclear uutarial is premnt
and at its proper location. The meteriala ac-
counting system can also supply infcmation that
ia uumful to OperstionR. A modem -toriali ac-
counting ●nd control ●yatem can wnitor proceaa
and equipwn: performance, material accumula-
tion, and operational ●aftty. This paper ahowa
how s modem MC&A system can provide usefttl
lnformatlofi on proceaa oystema ●nd demcribea ●
LOS Alamoa plw’1 to damonatraCo an integrated
proceu~ monitorln8/-teria1s mccountlns and con-
trol (PM/MC61A) •ys~em.
The operational benefits of tm integrated
pro:eta control/naar-real-time uatsri~la ac-
counting system ●ro many. CompuKorizad MCLA
systems ●vAllablc in modem process plants allow
closure of mter4ala balanceu on individual
material movsrerto or process operations. Frt-
quent closure~ on matertals balance areaJ (MBA~)
or individual ptoc~ss V@#OOIC ~~n Io(:allze and
ldantlfy procasm prohlema qulckty, The Advanced
Tastin~ Line for Actinlda Separations (ATM3)
PH/Mc&A system will monitor proceaa performance
and amsict tha operat~r and ●xpe,imenter by
accumulat{ns ●nd .malyaing axperimentai data,
Los Alamoe is plsnnin~ development and dem-
onstration of an integrated PM/MCSA system iII
the ATLAS at the Loa Alamoa Plutonium Facility.
The ATLAS will teat and demonstrate new methods
for ●queoua proceaaing of actinidoa and also
will develop, teat, and demonstrate concepts
for integrated procaas monitoring/materials con-
trol and accounting.
The ATLAS integrated PM/MC&A system will uae
personal computers located at the line to aid
the technician and rezearch scientiot. The PC-
based systcm ia designed to be modt~lar, trans-
portable, and to allow future growth. This
approach will permit fliture expanaion of the
system to include ●dditional proceta units and
modification to fit the peculiarities of spe-
cific unit operations.
The initial system will have tho capability
for prosreasive growth in ● staged manner so
that individual PM/MC&A concepts can b~ tested
●nd proven, revised, or discarded. The initial
Phaze I system will include:
nutomated generation of safeguards dath for
manual input to the Loa Alamos Materials
Accounting and Safeguard System (MASS),
●utomated chockiug of MASS inputs for con-
sistency and ●rrorc, and
monitoring ●nd ~uthorlzation of material
transfers tn ●ssure that Hpecia. nuc19ar
material (SNM) critical safety limits are
not exceeded,
Later phmses may includa:
●utomated capture of process and oafeguarrin
data for MASS ●ntry,
process eequence ●nd parameter rnalectlon
u-ins an “expert system” to nsaist the oper-
ator,
. material balances closure ding nonecc3unc-
●bilicy gr~ce process data co trace trans-
actianm, and
. auta~ted collection and analysis of experi-
mental data.
The integrate PU/IqCkA sy-tcm will heip the
aperacor .underatand and follow the Pe=farmanco
>f hls plant withoat tilnderins plant oporacions
and production. rnis project w+.11 develop a
camp~cer-eased system for tracking Che proca#a-
ing ald UKJ~-6M@UC of nuclear materials. The
syetcm will daamscrate the application of per-
sord computers lacaced in the operating ●rea,
at or near the procaea line, CO facilitate both
process aperationa and ~cerial safegwrds in ●
timely and ●fficient rnnner. Thi8 ●yscem would
-unite che proceaa controll~emnt and mate-
rials cone-oliaccounting data collection ●ystema
into a singLe, integrated syetam in which infor-
~tion i8 exchanged between these mymcese for
tneir wtual benefit. The syctu will be in-
stalled and tested ●s part of the ATIAS process
develo~nc line.
11. ImRmm’rIoa
A mdern ?lC&A ●yecem can follow procesc
perfo~nce ●nd detecc nonacandard condiciona.
The freqwnc cloture of materials Ealancnm on
individual procee8 units can crack Mterlals
proceaeing and ●quipment performance. This
●i lows che ●ystem to provide inforMtlon on
procese streame where meaaur~nts are imprac-
tical ●nd ldencify procmse upmeta or ●quipenc
misoperation. It can ●lso monitor -cerisl
cranafers in proceea ●qujpment ●nd glove boxes
to prevent the ●ccumulation of -Safe quantities
or monitor che accumulacim of SW in no~as-
urable areas.
The Pfl system provides ●dditional data in-
puca to cnc UCLA system chat can be tiaed ca
reconcile ~teriala balance clo=ureo when un-
explained discrepancies occur. Proceaa concrcl
data can provide information that ●llowe fre-
quanc balance cloeure ac the level of the in-
dividual proccas mit ●nd can localise real
macerlal Iosaes in both time and physical loca-
Clon.
.WU should uae ;=~cems control measurements
Wnenever feasible. fiere accountabllzty-~rada
‘naa~~remencs are noc ●vailable, SNN val~es ~arL
b- inferred from secondary correlations =sinr
procoes meas~remanco (der!sity, hiscarical val-
:J,o , ccc. ~ ar aCllar ●ttributes (VO1.UME tran~-
ferrod, ●tc.). The flUA sys.em should noc
impair plant operation ●nd production. A ~o~d
RICbA ●yacem should ●rknce the operacara !inder-
sCandinS ac prccess Sfstema performance.
~o gain a productive interaction between the
K&A and prscese control ●ystema. 9afe~uards ●nd
~peraciana personnel !miac work Csgetr.er during
cne initial stages of process and plant design.
l%eir goai should be :o provla- an ●ff=:cive
maceriaia accountifig eys<em chat pravlaer proc-
ess monitoring, =oncrol, and ocher aperatianal
benefits while iimicing coat impact..
III. A.WAWJSD TKST LINE POE ACIINIi18 SBPARA-
TIM
The ATIAS facility w.il rievelap the next
genmratisn af acticide processing and malyti:al
inscrumentacion. These new procedures ana
equipment will enhance Loa Aiamoa. .cbilicy ?:
proceaa intractable scrap in support of GOE
plutonium recovery efforts. The ATLAS is ● com-
plete procesainc iine witk the ability CO dis-
●lv- ●nd purify iucominc mterial and process
che reoulcing liquid ●nd solid waste. The f~.oor
plan is desi~ed in modules so chat ●quipment
can be mdified or replaced without disturbing
ocher operation. The flaor plan is shown in
Fit. 1. Flexjbilicy arid the capability co
process ● wide variety of ecrap will be provided
“@ins che flow sheet ●ho- in Fig. 2.
Each unit opera:ion haa been planned so
chat new proceashg concepcc can be installed
without upeert:ng chc entiire proce~a line. me
uoit operation ●pproach wili facilitate Che
implemhncation of the Comprehensive Hacerials
Accour.cing ●nd Safewrda Syatam (CAHCAS) by
allowing ~tarials balancea to be dr&wn arwnd
individual operations or a combination af dit
.Paratic-;a.
me A= uil! ●ccomplish several other
objectives besides prsd.ding research and pro-
duction auppoct for the 30R. Uich on-line ..real
Cima . ●nalytical cspabillcy, ● better .under-
scanding af the fundamental chemisc:y Involved
in all ●sp;ccs uf ect!nide procesalng will be
●chiaved. With thin info~cion, i.]proved proc-
●caing prxedures will be pasaibie. These ana-
lyticill chniquea will make -terials ●ccouz?-
Lng w% eas$er ●nd tmre a-curatw. The ATIAS
line will bec~ a focal point fcr cec’.n~ioey
●x.changa with other ticea ●nd aloo ?rovida che
Lechfiicsl direction for rhe platcmia processing
facilicle~ of tke future.
xv. kt@&iS& -ITO@INC AXO PATErnIALS ACCCNJNTINC
srsnm INTEmATIfM
me f~a’~p~ilty ~~ an ~n~egr=c~d pr:.~e,,
monitoring and rMterlal? rccc~rtlns system wac
derrron~crated durlns n ●erles nf teat runt :m-
ducted at cha Barnweil Wclear F~eis Procassi~F
plant in l~ao-a. 1 lhmce Cests d9morXtraL~d
both che t~rim.ccl fea~ibillC~ and Ee.18flLU cf
near-real-ciam ●cco.dcing (WTA] in an noera-
cional farility. bork :urrenciy :eing :cnd;~red
●c 3ak Rid8e National Leboracory i~ firtfie-
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Fig, 2, ATLAS flow sheet.
Tisingcr ●t. ●l. PAVO doscrlb~d ● distributed
processing cystam that providas both procoss
contrnl ●nd matorlals ●ccountant capabi~ity in
nuc lalr facilicios.~ This system, proposod
by tha Loo Alamo# Safa~tird# Systma Group in
1981,5 conaiat.. of groups of instruments ●nd
terminals in plant production ●nd support areas
connected to local minicomputers that are in
turn connected to ● central main computer, This
system 1s illustrated in Fig. 3.
Each processing location has instrumentation
and control requiramwmts that ●re specific to
that location. Computers concerned with accumu-
lation and manipulation of data from instruments
and control of th~ procema are located at tha
first 10VO:,
Information pertinent to production plun-
ning, forecasting, production reporting, etc.
requires accumulation of a limited subset of
information from lower level computers at an
intermediate leval in the system. Information
required for auditing and oversight of the
entire plant is collactod ●nd analyzed at the
top level. Access to top level data is limited
to those with a need for this data (safeguard,
management, and process ●nalysta) ●nd wouid be
secured to prevent unauthorized ●ccess.
Testing the feasibility of a distributed
processing system using interlined minicompu-
ters 1s currently underway ●t Loa Alamos. The
test #y#tam is diacuaaed in Ref 4. Thi- system
is the baaia for inatallstion of an integrated
safeguards/proceaa control system that prcvidea
tha poaltive featurea described below.
A. Procaas Control
Nuclear material processing operations fre-
quently have sideatreams (typically waatee) that
normally contain small to negligible amounts of
product, valuabld intermedlater, or hazardous
materials. These streama may nut be monitored
or mampled becausa they normally contain smell
quantities of material ~r because the measure-
ment 1s difficult, expensive, or lmpractival.
Undetected Losses via these tldestreama can lead
to ● loam of valuable material and adversely
impact operation by requiring the material to
ha recycled and reworked.
-[=yil
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Fig. 3. A distributed
Los Alamos has detected and monitored loss
of nuclear material wing the nuteriala account-
ing system in a mituation when procese inatru-
menta could not detect this loss. T*I 1980-81,
a series of tests were conducted at the Allied-
General Nuclear Services, Bamwell Nuclear Fuels
Plant to test the NRTA concept. 1 During these
tectu a series of planned diveraiona were made.
At the completion of one teat series, several
diversions were detected by the NRTA system,
and the point at which the material had been
removed was pinpointed. However, one diversion
was detected by the NCAA system that waa not a
part of the exercise.s T?Iis experietlce illua-
tratea how a materiala accounting system can
provide timely detection ●nd quantification of
material loss where nonzl monitoring ●ystema
are either unavailable or their installation ia
impractical.
The computerized materials accounting sys-
tems available in modern process planta allow
closure of balances on individual tranoactlons
(MOt6rhl umwemants or proceaa operation),
Frequant cloaurea on eub-4’4BAa or individual
vernsela will localize discrepancies leading to
timely identificatlotl of process problems. This
will facilitate timely adjustment of process
parmmtera, aaximizin8 proceta efficiency ●nd
minimizing coscly rework operations. This tech-
nique is being tested and demonatratee by
Ehlnger ●t nak Rjdge National kboratory in ●
material- accountant ●pplication.2
B. Nefwuremmts Coritrol
Process measurements must be utilized by
the MC&A system to realize a comprehensive and
cumplete materials accounting, Process instru-
ments are typically less accurate and l?ac well
msir$talned than “accountability gr?.de” inrntru-
menta, Procesm inttrumantation may be inaccu-
rate or infrequently calibrated. Neutron moni-
tors (provided for ctiticalit} aafaty) on ion
ex..hange roluoms, tankc, ●tc. a~e highly inaccu-
rate, and difficult to calibr~to but can provide
LEVEL 3
!2 P Q
~ LEVEL 2CPU -
Y
@+’1.iJ ‘;PU+J LEVEL 1
~–_
procei3 monitoring ayatem.
of this type can be calibrated by using the ?!CSIA
syat~m to track additions of material to indi-
vidual procees units. A mteriala accounting
system that includes detailed mterlals tracking
can monitor instrument performance, estimate
raaaauremsnt errors, and identify instruments
that are out-cf-calibration. Inrntrument biases
can be followed and quantified as they develop,
eliminating unknown errors and reducing instru-
ment service frequency. Maintenance can then
be scheduled only as needed.
Tank level measuring devices are infre-
quently calibrated because of the time and
effort required. The F$XA system can check the
calibration. hhen an intertank tranafer ia
nude, the quantity chipped and received ia
checked to verify completion of the tranafer
and L !COipt of ●ll material. Data required to
verify this transaction can alao !)@ used to
calibrate lavel inetrtmente.
Figure 4 illuztratea ● three-tank cyatem In
which the ●econd tank rontaina a level measuring
device with ● Low blaa. By comparing long-tann
data from the~e inatrumenta, it is possible to
locate this bias. A materlala balance drawn
●round the firet two tanks would ~nd~cate that
a continuous bleed of metorial (leak, diversion,
etc.) is occurring. However, if the materials
balance i, redrawn to include the second and
third tanks, it ie apparent that there is a
problem with me of the measurements aa there
ia now ● net production of material that coun-
terbalance the lose obeerved in the prior MBA.
The amount of bias in the level measurement in
the second tank can be quaiitified much that a
software fix can be used to recalibrate the
system.
The MC&A system should incorporate suftwaro
that compares related data to develop relative
errors, i.e., comparison of volume received va
volume sent, etc. This software can comiwsrr
relevant proceae date to monitor and establish
the magliltude of process mea~urernant error-.
velunbLe rnafes~rdc ~nfonnetion. An instrument
~..--... ....—..—...—...—....—..—.... ..... ..
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Figure h. Three-tank #ys’term with
measurement error.
Anomalier can frequently be resolved by
redrawing the PIBA so that the micsinll (or su~-
pect) data is not a critical component in the
nuterials balance equation. In the ●bove exam-
ple, reformulation of the tank MBA to include
ail three tanks would have eliminated the false
conclusions that resulted from the two-tank MBA
analyaes. This method is frequently effective
in resolving anomalies c.auaed by false readings
as the uuspect instrument can be eliminated from
the materials balance equation.
The MC&A system can be ua.d as a tool to
develop maarnurement control Chsrts for instru-
ment. Software updates can be msde simply,
quickly, and as required to maintain instrument
accuracies at the highect possible levels.
C. Operation Analyeis
The MC&A aystam collects and maintains ●
large database on materiala flows ●nd measure-
ments, This database concaina ● larga volume
of information that can be useful to the ●naly~t
who wants tb monitor, understand, and improve
the efficiency of hie operations. With thie
data he can ascertain the impact of minor
changesor.processperformance.By introducing
smell changee in process parameters, changes in
operation can be followed and quantified.
For example, the operatin~ temperature in a
process unit might bn changed. The MC6A system
can be used to track and quantify changes in
system performance. A aeriea of emall chang~s
can be ~ntroduce4 and tected under true plant
conditions to validate their usefulness. This
technique, known as Evolutionary Operation,
can be used in conjunction with the capabilltiea
of the MC&A systcm to optimize plant efficiency
and performance.
D. Reteriala Accounting
Becauae unexplained inventory differences
(IDIs) can disrupt process operations, the job
of a good safeguards officer is to maintain an
MChA syetem where anomalies are detected and
resolved with minimum impact on production.
The ability to obtain materials balance
closure is generally not limited by inaccuracies
in existing measurements, but rather by unme~s-
ured inventory or holdup. Spillage in glove
boxes, heels in calcinera or flourinators, de-
posite in vessels and pipee, etc. frequently
control ID and its associated limit of error.
Development of instruments to detect and quan-
tify holdup can alleviate this problem. How-
ever, development of these inatruus?nta may be
slow and pcesibly not cost-effective.
In handling fine sol.ide, holdup (spil’age)
in ,glove boxes ia a serious problem that ia
difficult to meaaure with any precision. The
holdup term frequently btcomee the mjor and
controlling source of uncertainty in the mate-
riala balance equation. By the use of tech-
niques taimilar to those used for checking in-
strument calibration, it is sometimes poaaible
to track th6 buildup of heels in veasela or
spills in glove boxes. If supported by valid
statistical methods, these data can be used to
develop holdup estimators for tha meterisls
balance equatisv resulting in reduced IDs.
Tracking of materials accumulation in smell,
localized process units during plant startup,
cleanout, and restart can yield statistically
supported eat.imetor~ of unmeasured inventory
that can be incorporated into the meteriale
ba!r.nce equation. l’hia investment of time at
startup can aliminate lster shutdowne for system
cleanout or anomaly resolution that would hinder
plant productivity. Modern materiala accounting
methods can produce data that pinpoints material.
loss to holdup and quantify the magnitude and
location of these ●pparent “losses.” Trieae data
will also show that what appears to be a signif-
icant loss is in reality the aum of manv mall
material ●ccunn~latlons and measurement errors.
v. !lYWIQl DESIGN
The prinury goal of this project la to
demon~trate the application of ●mall, at-line
computers to the control and monitoring of
nuclear material processiklg operation. A lec-
ond goal is to demNnmLrate that the functions
of process control/management and materiala con-
trol/accounting can be combined In ● aynergistlc
manner such that the benefits derived from thu
integrated system exceed tho sum of tile two
separated ~,acems.
The ATLAS PM/MC&A system will initially be
smell and simple with the ability for expansion
as needed and aa funding becomes available. The
initial system will consist of several personal
computers located at the proceaa line.
A. System Pumctimma
. Proceaa Ibmitorimg1 amd Control. The
ATLAS will handle a wide range of feed msteriala
each of which may require different processing
steps and varying amounts of chemical treatment.
The PM/MC&A system will provide “expert input”
to the operator to asoiat in set-up and opera-
tion of assay arid meaaurewnt systems. The
“expert system “ will determine sample require-
ments, provide instrument calibration instruc-
tions, select calibration standards, etc. on
the basis of sample character.
The system will perform muteriala balance
and stoichiometric calculations for process
operations requiring addition of reagenta and
splitting or combining of batches. The system
will calculate the proper amount of chemicala
required by the process on the basia of feed
type and composition.
Eventually the ayatem will provide the pri-
mary source of procedures ●nd operating plans
for expari~nta carried out in the ATLAS line.
The system will have the capability to record
and archive ●ll data taken during the course of
an experiment or process run. Operating plans
provided by request will detail ~terial trana-
fers between proceaa units and proceoaiog steps
that ● re required. The plan can ●lao provide ●
listin~ of required sampling and measurement
data.
The cystem will maintain ● databaae contain-
ing measurements control data for all ATLAS Liue
instrumentation. The ~asurememts control ●oft-
ware will be compatible with the ●xiatins FUSS
information ●nd capabilities, Current MASS con-
trol charts ●nd statistical tests will be run
on mechinea located ●t th~ measurement point
with monitoring and oversiSht performed by the
MASS to ●saure veracity ●nd integrity,
2. Material. Comtrol. Tha mowment and
proceoaing of material will be monitored by the
PM,OIC&A system, which will track ●nd maintain
an archival record of ●ll material movements
and processing operations. A’~thorixation to
muve nuclear material between ~lit process areaa
(UPAS) shall be obtaiued by the opex tor from
the system prior to movement,
The PM/MC&A @ycteta will aasure that all SNM
la transferred in ●ccordance with ●utabllahed
safety procedures and that SNM lnventoriea in
UPAe are within criticality safaty limits. The
rnyb’~m will maintain ● log of material inven-
tor within each UPA to assure that criticality
-afaty llm(ts are not exceeded and ●larm if a
request for transfer of metctrial into a UPA
could lead to inventory in exceaa ot criticality
safety limits. l%% aysLem will request and
record operator acknowledgement of all alarma.
The system will also have the capability to
list all in-line SNM inventories by location on
demand.
At a future date materials movement and
proceaaing will be a two-stage proceaa. In the
firat stage an operationa plan will be prepared
by the supervisor and entered into the system.
The second or transaction stage will be carried
out by a separate person (generally an operator)
who will conduct the actual processing or trans-
fer operation.
3. ?kteriale Accotmtiog. In its initial.
phaae all PM/MC&A eystem inputs/outputs will be
manual. ~ter phssea will demonstrate elec-
tronic capture of data and automatic transfer
of materials accounting data into the Loa Alamos
rlAss ,
The system will pre-proceaa MASS data to
locate errora, o~iaaiona, ●nd anomullea ao that
they may be identified and reconciled in a
timely and efficient manner. Some pre-procesa-
ing of data for the MASS will aloo be performed.
The system will not replace nor interfere with
the Loa Alamoa FLAW system, which ia the primary
mterialn control ●nd accountability system for
the Laboratory.
Moat MASS iuputa can be determined on the
bauia of ● material typa or prior processing
history; this knowledge will be used to gener-
●te, for the operator, data required by MASS.
At ● later stage the system will ●utomatically
selact ●nd input data to the MASS. Historical
data pattema ●nd standard patterna developed
by knowledgeable technical personnel would be
compared with input data to identify ●omalles
for oparat.or or ●uperviaory review; prelimin.sry
material balancea would be closed to locate
inconsistencies ●nd identify possible erroneous
inputs.
At ● future date the system will ba upgraded
to calculate an ID for all tranaactiona in ‘the
ATLAS line. ID records will be of two types: a
preliminary inventory difference (PID) and a
final inventory difference (FID), The P[D may
be calculated using inp’lt obtained from indirect
eatimstes of SNFl values, best gueaaeo, or other
appropriate data. An FID My be calculated only
with approved, “accountability grade” data.
All IDu shall have an aaaociated limit of
●rror calculated from current data contained in
the meaqurementa control dacabaae, A cumula-
tive SUM record of inventory differancea al*~
associated error ).~mita in each UPA shall be
ms~ntained for the prior and currant month. At
the eud of each month, meteriala accountl,,g data
from tha prior nwmth’s accour.ting data~.asa will
be archived to magnetic media.
The Computer Aided Process Surveillance Sys-
tem (CAPS) will assist in the performance of
process monitoring and control, materials con-
trol, and materials accounting functions for
the ATLAS line. The primary functions of the
CAPS system are described below. Other opera-
tions we might provide are measurements control
and bar-coded materials management and identi-
fication.
B. Sy8ta9 Srmivare
Equipment will be des@ned for 10CA1 (at-
line) operation and maintenance by Lab personnel
in the plant operating area. Tho operating area
in a regulated area subject to occasional low-
level radioactive contamination.
Eqlipment will be selected to facilitate
future system upgrades and/or expansion. System
flexibility is required because the system will
evolve in a continuous manner and it will be
difficult to predict future directions of both
the ATLAS research program and PM/MCU develop-
mentt,,
System design will provide capability for
future direct electronic transmission of ATLAS
instrumentation data to the PM/MC6A system, out-
put of data to the MASS .sy8tem, and interconnec-
tion with other at-line computers monitoring
other process areaa.
The system shall be designed with an “open-
-ended” architecture to allow future expansion
by addition of other computors @nd terminals
using the same vendor hardwara.
c. !iptem Software
The system software will be daaignod for
simple, reliable, and easy use by am operator
at the process line with minimal traini~. The
system will ●now ● technically degroed, compu-
tor knowledgeable (but not proficient) super-
visor without a computer science or related
degree to develop operatin~-plans, data-sheets,
calculation macros, etc.
The system will ●now progrming of oper-
ating-plans, data forms, and instructions by
engir.eert/@cientists having limited knowledge
about computer ays terns and languages. TM
selacted language ●hmll be menu driven with
simple “English language” driven programing
capability. A Lotus 1-2-3 or similar, consoon,
enay-to-use software format will ba used.
Data lnpltto from experimental runs will be
by manual input at a local terminal. Operating
plana will be developed on a oeparate computer
at ● remote location ●nd tranaferrod to the
ayatem via floppy difik. Output from the CAPS
ayatem will be to ● local monitor With option
for hard-copy output to a local printer or
floppy disk.
All code will be modular to facilitate in-
dependent testing of individual or linked mod-
ules and to allow future revision of existing
modules or addition of new modules. The system
will be designed to allow growth and evolution
in atop with technology improvements and a con-
tinuing research program.
VI. COIWXUS1ON
fie primary benefit of a materiala account-
ing system to the plant operator is that it will
help him to understand and follow the operation
and performance of hie plant. With dmta from
the MC&Asystem, he can ascertain the impact of
minor changea on performance. The proceaa can
thereby be fine-tuned to give optimum perform-
ance. Any deviation from optimum performance
pan be detected and conditions restored to those
that are optimum for the particular plant and
operating environment.
The NC&A system should not hinder plant
operations and production. Operation person-
nel should use the MC&A system to provide an
enhanced understanding of process systems per-
formance. M(XA personnel can provide assistance
in the planning sta~es in determining where
accounting vill be a problem MO operation can
use their time productively. In s~ry, Opera-
tion personnel can uee an HCLA ●yztem to their
advantage rather than letting the NC&A syetem
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